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FOREWORD 
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of 
professional interest to officers of the naval service. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are 
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy 
Department or of the Naval War College. 
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THEATRE LOGISTIC PLANNING 
A lecture delivered by 
Capt. Henry E. Eccles, USN 
at the Naval War College 
March 28, 1950 
I-INTRODUCTION
RESTRICTED 
An understanding of theater logistic planning is bas�d on 
the understanding of: 
The nature and structure of Logistics ; the art of command; 
and the nature of war. 
These subjects are all so intertwined that there is no ad­
vantage in trying to decide which comes first, the hen or the egg. 
Furthermore, we are not so· much concerned with the mani­
fold details of planning and planning forms as we are with the 
major elements, problems and relationships that confront the 
theater commander in planning his logistics. So I shall disriiiss: d¢­
tails and forms with the statement that planning forms are in a 
process of development in all our major military colleges and many 
important details of theater logistics are ably discussed in Chapter 
VII of "Joint Overseas Operations". Rather than go into detail in 
these matters let me take my cue from the 3rd Chapter of the 
Second Epistle to the Corinthians where St. Paul says-"Not of the 
letter but of the spirit. For the letter killeth but the spirit -giveth 
life." Let us therefore try to develop the basic spirit· or philosophy 
of theater logistics: 








First, a definition of Logistics : 
"Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the 
conduct of military operations. Logistics pro­
vide the means therefor." 
This broad and simple definition has the great advantage of 
expressing a relationship between the three major elements of war. 
Every problem in war contains these three elements in varying 
degrees. Perhaps it will help us to consider them as three inter-
secting rings. (Illustration No. 1). 
Logistics itself can be said to have three basic elements: 
The Determination of Requirements; Procurement and 
Distribution, and the aspects of Organization, Planning, Execution 
and Supervision. These elements and aspects all enter into every 
problem in logistics and they blend and overlap in manner and de­
gree which varies greatly according to circumstances. 
In general, logistic problems fall into the six broad categories 
of Personnel, Supply, Maintenance, Medical, Transportation and 
Base Development, or simplifying it greatly, Men, Material and 
Services. 
III-THE UNIFIED COMMAND
Theater Logistic Planning derives directly from the concepts
of Unified Command as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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"In the future, theaters of war will be organized as 
Unified Commands. In so far as practicable each service 
will handle its own logistics under broad coordinating 
policies established by the Unified Commander. But when 
the Unified Commander sees the need for the consolida­
tion of logistic activity he will tell us and we will order 
it. Furthermore, the Unified Commander by reason of his 
authority of review of requirements and recommendations 
of priorities and programs, has the power to exercise direct 
logistical control almost as he sees fit just so long as he 
keeps out of operating detail.." 
If we examine the proposed draft of "Joint Action Armed 
Forces," Chapter III Section VII "Logistics (Wartime) ," we see 
that the conferees who may have been at odds in many other in­
stances, agree on the nature and degree of control the theater com­
mander may exercise in war. Theater Commanders will have the au­
thority to exercise a very high degree of control in that they are 
specifically responsible for policy and coordination in distribution, 
supply build-up, maintenance, salvage, base development, trans­
portation, port operation, medical and dental service and military 
government. Thus we have real unification in the theater of war. 
IV-THE NATURE OF WAR
A few words on the nature of war as it affects theater
logistic planning. It is a truism to say that the only constant in 
war is variation. War is the constant interplay of variables. In 
general it is fought in accordance with campaign plans designed to 
accomplish specific objectives, the selection of which is the task of 
strategy. The campaign plan for the Central Pacific was originally 
drafted in late 1943 and given the code name Granite. In its or-
4 RESTRICTED 
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iginal form it contemplated five separate major amphibious opera­
tions-Gilberts, Marshalls, Eniwetok, Truk and the Marianas. This 
was amended in June 1944 to abandon Truk, and extend the offen-
sive through Palaus, Mindinau, Luzon, and Formosa and Amoy on 
the China Coast. While this campaign plan was not- followed pre­
cisely, it nevertheless provided the foundation for the logistic sup­
port of the actual operations we did undertake. 
Campaigns are usually made up of a series of operations 
which themselves may be either simple or complex, brief or pro­
tracted, depending on the characteristics of the theater of war, the 
capabilities of the opposing forces and other variables. All wars 
. seem to have one common characteristic, i. e., they consist of long 
periods of comparative inactivity interspered with short periods 
of violent conflict. However, this period of comparative quiet is 
actually the period of logistic build-up. The process may be likened 
to the charging and discharge of an electrical condenser. 
This is very well illustrated by a graph of cargo and person­
nel shipped by the Army to overseas Atlantic areas in the last war. 
(Illustration No. 2) Note particularly the expanding scale of activity 
and the build-up before each operation. 
Looking at this from a purely theoretical point of view we 
may analyze the chart somewhat as follows: (Illustration No. 3) 
A steady expansion of theater forces engaged in routine operations 
such as patrols, reconnaissance and defensive actions, a progressive 
build-up of supplies and equipment for a campaign, and special 
build-up and measures for specific operations. 
Actually, the build-up prior to each operation only partially 
supported the operation it was intended for. In the Pacific we 
found often that we were financing one operation with the ma­
terial and men originally assembled for the previous one, but which 
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-arrived opportunely enough to be of use in the base development of
the island just captured.
V-THE BASIC THEATER LOGISTIC PLAN
The charts have shown a: steadily expanding logistic effort. 
How do we coordinate this expansion and at the same time pro­
vide for the efficient support of our day-to-day operations? Here we 
come to the philosophic basis of theater logistic planning and again 
I present a purely theoretical concept: A Basic Theater Logistic 
Plan-a plan which in actual practice may very well be Paragraph 
4 or the Logistic Annex of a conventional campaign plan. This 
basic plan is the heart and soul of the day-to-day operations in a 
theater of war and it provides the material build-up for the initia­
tion of offensive operations. 
Let us start in the center of the chart (Illustration No. 4) 
and work out. Every basic theater logistic plan is built .on four 
fundamental considerations. First, . the characteristics of the 
theater, its geography, topography and hydrography, its relative 
distances and its distance from the continental U. S. Next we 
have the - forces involved, then the nature of the operations con­
templated and finally, the requirements for mutual or inter­
theater support. 
In the second circle we have six functional elements; Supply, 
Maintenance, Medical, Personnel, Transportation and Base Devel� 
opment. You may choose any functional elements you wish-those 
shown here are merely representative groupings of the major ele­
ments which seem to be common to all theatres. 
The theatre commander examines each functional element in 
the light of the inter-play of variables in the four fundamental con­
siderations and reaches certain types of decisions, which are indi-
8 RESTRICTED 
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cated in the outer ring. The theater commander will decide to ex­
ercise direct control of certain' elements. In other cases he will 
delegate control to component commanders. In some instances he 
will consolidate all of certain activities, in other cases he will merely 
outline general policies. A:nd finally in my opinion he wm · be wise 
to ignore certain matters, particularly problems which may work 
themselyes out if left alone. 
The summation of these decisions becomes the basic theater 
logistic plan. If wisely developed this not only establishes the pro­
cedures and policies governing the normal logistics of the theater 
but it becomes sound standing operating procedure for the develop­
ment of the logistics of specific operations. 
On 31 October 1945 CINCPOA'S standing operating pro­
cedures governing logistic support of theater forces filled 98 pages. 
These were condensations and revisions of many times that volume 
of directives which were in effect on V-J Day. By proper planning I 
think they could have been boiled down to 20 to 30 pages. 
VI-DETAILS OF THE BASIC PLAN
With this general background let us discuss some of the as­
pects of this plan. First, consider the relation between supply and 
transportation. In any war of the future, -American forces must 
combine great firepower with great mobility. It may well be that 
an increase . in the efficiency and reliability of our transportation 
and distribution system will permit us to lower our usual levels of 
supply without danger to our combat forces. This would, of course, 
increase mobility. In any event we must realize that any unnec­
essarily high level of supply reduces mobility. 
It is very probable that the theater commander will keep a 
very close watch on his supplies of ammunition. This is a very 
10 RESTRICTED 
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specialized field and with the increasing use of new types of guided
missiles and rockets, new problems in storage_ and distribution will 
undoubtedly arise. 
The very fact that an area petroleum officer is a member of 
every theater commander's staff indicates that the theater com­
mander actually controls the distribution of petroleum throughout 
his command. In this connection it is well to remember that when 
we operate major Naval task forces overseas, the oil requirements 
are so great that any advanced base storage we can build ashore 
is merely a. surge tank in the supply pipeline of fast tankers. 
When we remember that one B-36 bombardment group will 
burn up a million gallons of aviation gasoline on a single mission, 
and that our fleet in its operations at Okinawa used twelve million 
barrels of oil, the importance of close control of petroleum products 
at the theater level should become very clear. This is especially so 
since this tremendous bulk must be kept in motion ; it may be 
slowed, or speeded up, but there is no way that any considerable part 
may be set down to await prospective use. There just never is that 
much storage capacity. Furthermore any undue retention of fast 
tankers to build up ready supplies will result in shortages months 
later. 
VII----TRANSPORTATION 
In addition to its effect on levels of supply, the subject of 
transportation raises some very interesting points. From·time to 
time the suggestion is made that ocean transportation will be con­
trolled wholly from Washington. While undoubtedly Washington. 
must of necessity exercise a very important degree of control in 
world shipping, still we must remember that the theater command­
ers have the major combat operational responsibility and therefore 
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must have commensurate logistical operational authority. Actually 
a compromise will probably be made but it should be based on recog­
nition of many considerations. 
The subject of transportation falls into two main categories; 
operation and traffic management, and an understanding of the na­
ture of these is important to all who deal with logistics. Operation 
•concerns itself primarily with the most efficient management of the
carrier, be it ail airplane, a truck or a ship. Traffic management is 
concerned with the most efficient distribution of the material which
is being transported.
It is very important that these two aspects of transporta­
tion be considered as separate and that their relative importance be 
clearly understood. The proper goal of carrier operation is to serve 
. the demands of traffic management.· 
In considering operation we must bear in mind that oceanic 
shipping is world-wide and so cuts across all theaters of war and 
that in wartime it involves commercially-manned as well as Navy­
manned ships, that it is internationally owned and operated and 
.. that it involves so-called strategic shipping and cargoes for the sup­
port of allies and neutrals as well as the strictly military or op­
. erational cargoes. However, a theater combat commander views his 
transportation problem as a whole whereas the transportation op­
eration agencies may tend to view their problems from the some­
what narrower aspect of a shipping company, an airline or a truck­
ing company or railroad. 
When a theatre commander has this broad point of view he 
may change th� emphasis of his concern from one means of trans­
portation to another as varying needs of the combat situation de­
mand, and make the necessary adjustments .. 
12 RESTRICTED 
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If all transportation were to be controlled from Washington, 
that responsiveness to immediate or vital local needs would tend to 
become sluggish. On the other hand the theater commander must un­
derstand the far-reaching effects of "retentions" on the whole ship­
ping picture. 
We may conclude therefore that the theater commander 
must exercise a high degree of control of all transportation, that 
the actual carrier operation be delegated, and that the theater com­
mander reserve to hims�lf movement control and traffic manage­
ment. The control of material flow is. best exercised by allocations 
of cargo space to component commanders. It goes �ithout saying 
that the commander himself must understand the nature of the 
problem. In addition he requires the staff assistance of experts in 
this important and highly specialized field. 
In a very real sense we may think of transportation as the 
mortar, or bond, that ties all parts of the theater logistic system 
together. All over the theater, men and material are constantly 
in motion. A bottleneck anywhere inevitably slows down traffic 
all along the line, and a sudden closing of any valve may well rup­
ture the pipeline. An enormous amount of energy is lost in the 
inertia of starting and stopping the flow, and it should be the 
theater commander's objective to keep the flow of traffic as smooth 
and continuous as his military operations will permit. 
The general term maintenance covers a multitude of prob­
lems. In a theater in .which major naval forces are operating, it 
includes ship maintenance, repair and salvage. Normally of course 
such matters are of primary concern to the Navy Component 
Commander (Fleet Commander) who handles them through the 
type and task force commanders. However, in such cases we fre­
quently find that the theater commander is a Naval officer and in 
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that case, so far, he has always worn two hats, theater and fleet, in 
which case the theater commander is very much concerned with 
such problems and his plans so indicate. 
VIII-PLANNING FOR A SPECIFIC OPERATION
Rather than dwell too long on the basic theater logistic 
plan, let us pass to logistic planning for a specific operation. It is in 
connection with these specific operations that we encounter two 
terms that are frequently misused: "feasibility" and "calculated 
risk". In some instal!ces it is considered that the logistics section 
of a staff decides the logistic feasibility of a contemplated course 
of action. This, of course, is not the case. The logistics section 
assists the commander in determining feasibility by making a 
logistic estimate or staff study. This estimate is a calculation of 
the logistic requirements necessary to support the operation, and 
a study of how logistic resources may best be employed to fulfill 
these requirements. The summary includes statements of pros­
pective deficiencies, with estimates as to how these deficiencies may 
limit the freedom of action of the commander and recommendations 
as to what can or should be done to overcome or compensate for 
the prospective deficiencies. The commander then decides the logistic 
feasibility of his course of action and he decides the risk involved, 
balancing this calculated risk against the gains to be achieved. · I 
know of no finer discussion of the calculated risk than that con­
tained on page 34 of Fleet Admiral King's, "US Navy �t War 
1941-1945.". Calculating risk is an exacting exercise of profess­
ional judgment and the term should not be used loosely as a 
blanket to cover the corpse of sloppy thinking. 
Planning for an operation has the same general character­
istics as basic planning in that it derives from, and must be cons. 
14 RESTRICTED 
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current with, strategic planning, and it is governed by the same 
basic considerations, and results in similar types of decisions. · But 
in ope;ational planning, most logistic tasks are delegated to task
force commanders with the component and type commanders acting 
in support. However, the need for keeping the enemy off balance 
requires that offensive operations be launched as rapidly as logistic 
considerations permit. Since task force planning staffs cannot be 
rapidly asssembled and then quickly start to plan effectively, it 
is necessary. for th� theater commander to prepare many of the 
plans that in theory .should be made by the task force commander. 
There simply is no other staff which can do this work in time to 
meet target dates. 
The most practicable means of "beating" the vital factor of 
lead time is by submitting long range forecasts. In World War II 
CINCPOA issued staff studies and general planning directives 
months in advance of his operational directives and this enabled -his 
component and type commanders to calculate and submit material . 
and personnel forecasts. This combination of staff study and pla�­
ning directive also permitted concurrent strategic and logistic plan­
ning at the operational level. Furthermore, even if the targets aiid 
dates were shifted, the logistic support built up by the forecasts 
usually fitted the new operation very well; 
We should never forget the fact that operational logistics 
actually acquire great and real physical momentum. Thousands 
of tons of solid material are actually moving. While tinder favorable 
conditions we can change the direction of the mass or somewhat 
modify its composition, there are other conditions where all the 
orders in the world have no effect. Recognition of lead time, fore­
casting, decentralization of execution, etc., all contribute to the 
flexibility we desire. Nevertheless we must understand that a 
reasonably good plan that is understood and is feasible of accom-
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plishment is far superior to the "perfect plan" which is difficult to 
understand and issued too late. So there always comes a time when 
we must· say "This is it-Let well· enough alone-No more 
changes!" 
I recommend to all of you the study of the plans for the 
' 
' 
· Olympic Operation, the invasion of Kyushu. For while there was in
that operation a dangerous lack of clarity in command relations,
the plans reflected very valuable experience in logistic planning.
IX-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Let me off er some thoughts as to certain principles which ap­
ply to logistic planning at theater level. But first a word of caution 
as to the use of the word "principles". Since we are only just be­
ginning to develop logistic theory and principle we should not use 
the word in its strictest sense but rather in a very broad sense as a 
statement of something that we believe to be generally true. 
First: The combat commander must have control of his own 
logistic support. 
The corollary to this is that he must be competent to and 
prepared to exercise this control in harmony with the overall war 
effort-that is to say, in accordance with the principles of mutual 
support and unity of effort. A further corollary is that he must 
have a staff which is educated and organized to assist him to ex­
ercise this authority. To illustrate the growth of such a staff let us 
note the growth of the logistic section of Cincpoa's staff from Sep­
tember 1943 to July 1945: (Illustration No. 5) 
Second: As long as the supply of an itein or a "service" ex­
ceeds the requirement for that item or servi�e, strict control is not 
16 RESTRICTED 
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necessary. When, however, a shortage exists, then theater control 
is called for. 
I suggest three corollaries to this : 
(a) The fewer the matters in which the theater com­
mander finds it necessary to exercise his power of con­
trol the better the logistic system and situation in: that 
theater. 
(b) A major task of the theatre logistics officer is to
look· ahead and anticipate shortages and the consequent 
need for controls, before they occur. 
(c) Any system of control of short items must be based
on allocations in order to be effective. Priorities, except as 
part of allocations, are ineffective and self-defeating. 
Third: The more detail that is put into any plan or order, 
the shorter the period of time during which that plan can usefully 
serve and the fewer the number of organizations that can be ef­
fectively controlled. 
Fourth: The higher the authority promulgating on order, 
the greater the time and effort required to milke a necessary change, 
and the more serious the consequences of a mistake or error in 
judgment. 
Fifth: Power and authority attract power and authority ·· 
.-They are magnetic. 
When the Unification Act of 1947 was first framed this 
tendency was clearly recognized. The Staff of the Joint Chiefs 
was limited to one hundred and the Secretary of Defense was pro­
hibited from having a military staff. The Joint Chiefs are now 
18 RESTRICTED 
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permitted a staff of two hundred and ten and the civilian employees 
of the Secretary of Defense have increased greatly. Furthermore, 
it would appear that many officers who are carried on the personnel 
allowance lists of the military departments are actually spending 
much of their time performing duty with other offices within the 
Department of Defense. 
I mention these matters 1 because I fear the magnetic effect 
of power in that it will create a tendency in the Department of De­
fense to encroach upon the prerogatives and functions of theater 
commanders, and create principalities within the kingdom of the 
commander. 
X-EVALUATION OF LOGISTIC PLANS 
Many of you will leave here to. assume major planning res­
ponsibilities. I, therefore, suggest certain criteria which may be 
useful in evaluating the logistic plans you may encounter. 
But first a caution: We should always remember that any 
particular logistic plan can be analyzed only on the basis of a full 
knowledge of the strategic concepts and plans it is designed to sup­
port and · of the background of the command organization in the 
command itself. It is vital that all strategic and logistic planning 
be in fact concurrent, and all strategic plans be kept within the. 
limitations of our logistic capabilities. 
When you are sure of these fundamentals you may then ask: 
Are the theater command and the theater staff 
structures both designed for war? 
Is the theater Jtaff truly a joint staff? 
Are the plans up to date? 
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Do the plans provide for the · expansion and provision of 
logistic resources and services prior to the expansion of 
combat elements? 
Are the plans within the limitations of our mobilization 
capabilities? 
Do the plans provide a maximum degree of central policy 
control with decentralized execution and operation? 
Are the responsibilities of the component and type com­
manders clearly defined? 
Do the plans place reliance on standing operating pro­
cedures? 
Are there . provisions for reporting and redistributing 
excess stocks ? 
Do they provide for ready cross-servicing and use-of com­
mon facilities? 
Are there provisions for inter-theater mutual support? 
If these questions can be answered yes, the chances are 
that the plans and organizations will function well in war. In all 
cases, however, beware of a superficial analysis. 
XI-CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me leave you with these thoughts; Theater
strategic and logistic planning are inseparable. In addition to 
growing concurrently with the strategic plans, the logistic plans " 
are intimately related to the command organization. A sound 
theater staff organization is essential to the formulation of good 
logistic plans and to their smooth execution. 
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Theater logistic planning consists of two main parts: First, 
the Basic Theater Logjstic Plan (Paragraph 4 or the logistic an­
nex of a conventional Campaign Plan), and second, developing from 
this, the Logistic Plan for a Specific Operation (Para 4 or the 
Logistics Annex of the Operation Plan). 
While good planning forms, factors and usage data are es­
sential tools, they themselves do not constitute nor produce good 
plans. Good plans are the product of the skilled professional 
judgment of the planner. 
And finally-Don't expect the plan you draw up in peace­
time to be the plan you necessarily use in war. Any peacetime 
plan, when you do not have or exercise the initiative, is merely 
the foundation and mental preparation for what you must do in 
war. And that mental preparation is more important than the 
plan itself. For only when the planning process, its major con­
siderations, and the various relations of cause and effect are clear­
ly understood, can our commanders make the rapid readjustments 
that are required when the early course of the war follows the 
enemy's plan rather than our plan. 
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND THEIR APPLICATION 
TO STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
A lecture delivered by 
Captain G. K. Carmichael, USN 
at the Naval War College. 
August 17, 1950 
The task of the Naval War College mission is to further an 
understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, with. emphasis on 
their application to future naval warfare. Accordingly, it is 
my purpose this morning to examine some of the fundamental truths 
of war and to indicate how these so-called principles of war are ap­
plicable to strategy and tactics. 
Although exact definitions of the fields of war-strategy, tac­
tics, and logistics-are difficult to arrive at, and may create futile 
discussion as to semantic distinctions, some definitions are desirable 
as a basis for study and discussion. 
The dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for joint usage, issued· 
by the .Joint Chiefs of Staff, defines strategy and tactics as follows: 
Strategy is defined as : "The art and science of developing and 
using the political, economic, psychological, and armed forces of a 
nation, during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support 
to national policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favor� 
able consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat." 
It may be noted that this definition of strategy is broad in 
scope. It includes not only the military aspects, but also the politi­
cal, economic, and psychological aspects of a nation's conduct, during 
Captain Carmichael is a member of the staff of the Naval War College. 
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both peace and war. It has as its. purpose not only the winning· of 
war, but also of winning the peace by increasing the favorable con­
sequences of victory. In this sense the term is often referred to as 
"national strategy", or "grand strategy". Whfn the term strategy 
is restricted to the employment of armed forces it is someti:rµes 
spoken of as "military strategy", and it is in this sense that I shall 
use the term strategy in this discussion. 
Tactics is defined as: One, "The employment of units in com­
bat", and two, "The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in 
relation to each other and/or to the enemy." 
Recent developments in the scientific field, such as radar, long 
range rockets, and guided missiles make it difficult to determine 
just when forces may be said to be in contact with the enemy; or 
even in combat, and, it becomes diffi�ult to differentiate be­
tween strategy and tactics, And, although it may be impossible to 
say at just what point the field of strategy, of tactics, or of logis­
tics leaves off and another of these fields begins, there are certain 
fundamental principles which govern in all three of these fields of 
warfare. These are the principles of war-principles which may be 
applied to arrive at strategic, tactical or logistical concepts of war. 
It has been said that the only thing constant in war is change 
itself. Throughout history, new inventions have dictated changes in 
strategy, tactics, and logistics. As for naval tactics, we can observe, 
for example, how the cannon changed the tactics of ramming and 
boarding to one of maneuver.and fire concentration out to the maxi­
mum gun range, or how Naval Air has changed the Battle Line con­
cept of capping the "T" of the enemy line to the Carrier Task Force 
concept of striking a crippling blow against the enemy fleet at the 
extreme range of the attack plane. 
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Let us consider for a moment the ten chief t�ctical principles 
formulated by Lord Nelson ,and employed by him with such suc­
cess. They are: 
1. The principle objective is the complete annihilation of the
enemy's fleet: partial victory is not enough.
2. Concentration of own masses against enemy fractions.
3. A close and decisive action is necessary.
4. Units must support each other and keep close to the enemy.
5. It is necessary for subordinates to know the plans of the com­
mander-in-chief, whose principal business is to bring the en­
emy to action on the most, advantageous terms.
6. The division of large fleets into squadrons whose commanders , ·· 
have full discretion.
7. Consideration of the moral qualities of an adversary is an
essential factor.
8. The order of sailing is the order of battle, and the less man­
euvering the better.
9. "Time is everything", and simplicity of method is desirable.
10. Victory must be followed up.
The basis of these tactical doctrines is the principles of war
-the principle of the objective, of mass, of the offensive, of man-
·. euver, of simplicity. However new weapons have dictated changes
in these tactical concepts. No longer is close action necessary to
destroy the enemy, and no longer is the "order of sailing the order 
of battle". Thus, it may be seen that, while tactics are fluid and 
ever changing, certain fundamental truths or principles .of war are 
constant. It is the application of these principles which is.variable, 
and not the principles themselves. 
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Often strategic and tactical changes have been slow in fol­
lowing the development of new weapons. To those nations who have 
first shown an appreciation of the strategic and tactical signifi�ance 
of. new weapons, there has accrued a distinct, and sometimes, a de­
eisive, advantage. For example, it was many years before the 
armies of the world appreciated the tactical significance of the 
maneuverability of fire power in the tank, motorized artillery and 
infantry, as embodied in the German Panzer Division. Yet, the de-
. cisive role that th� Panzer Division played against the static de­
fenses of the Maginot ljne is without question. 
Today, :with unparalleled advances in new weapons, it is 
essential that we develop new strategic and tactical concepts in or­
der to realize the. maximum effectiveness .from the tools available. 
Similarly, intelligence as to the developments and techniques of our 
possible enemies takes on an added significance. 
We must answer such questions as these. How, and under 
what circumstances, should we employ the atom bomb? Is it to be 
used primarily in a strategic or a tactical sense ? How may the 
enemy use the bomb? What active and what passive defense 
measures should we employ against the A bomb threat? From a 
Naval tactical viewpoint, what changes must we make in our dis­
positions for cruising, for battle, for amphibious assault? And the 
same type of study must be given to the implications of the many 
. other new developments-the jet plane, the rocket, the guided 
missile, and the true submersible. 
In early 1939 the old battleships New York and Texas were 
given what is now called radar equipment for full sca1e test afloat. 




implications of this new weapon were enormous. It was re-
ported on along these lines: It is the greatest invention since the 
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advent of radio; it wilf revolutionize naval gunnery and tactics. It 
was recommended that an immediate procurement program should 
be initiated to equip at the earliest possible time all battleships, 
carriers, and cruisers. As we review that report today, it was 
prophetic. And, yet, someone a1ong the line was slow in appreciating 
the urgency and soundness of those recommendations and decided 
to contract for only_ six (6) equipments to be installed in cruisers 
for further test and evaluation. Thus, a year or so, was largely 
lost, iilf period of an impending crisis, during which we could have 
equipped a major portion of our fleet with radar, developed our 
technique, and trained our personnel in its employment and main­
tenance. I cite thi.s example for two reasons; first to emphasize the 
enormous importance of adjusting quickly our tactical concepts to· 
new weapons; and secondly, to indicate that there are times when a 
new weapon should be expoited when it is a serviceable one-with" 
out waiting for the technical people and the scientists to produce 
what they consider to be a perfect, or near perfect, instrument. There 
are other times, however, when new weapons should not be employed 
until they are available in quantity. This will be indicated in later 
discussion. 
It is possible to find many instances of the technical bureaus' · 
keeping a weapon in the test stages long after it was serviceable, 
searching for this or that answer-which might well have come 
sooner if it had been put into service and given operational field 
tests. We might now do more toward getting the bugs out of some 
of our guided missiles, for example, and, certainly we could do more 
toward developing strategic and tactical concepts as how best to 
employ them if they were put into production now and gotten out to 
the operating forces. Time may be running out. And it takes time 
to develop techniques and train in the employment, servicing, and 
maintenance of new weapons. 
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Korea should prove an excellent testing ground for new 
weapons and new strategic and tactical concepts based on such 
weapons. To so make it, a deliberate and studied program should 
be initiated. The opportunity we have there is analogous to that 
which Germany utilized so effectively in Spain prior to World 
War II. 
Our tactical concepts today are largely those of World War 
II and need close examination and study to adapt them to the ne"". 
weapons being developed. It is a real challenge to condition our 
minds, not to World War II but to World War III concepts. It is not 
enough in solving military problems to dive into USF2 or USF4 or 
FMlOl-10 and come up with an answer. Use them, yes; but, by all 
means, try to devise something better than cruising disposition 4C 
or battle disposition 4M-something which considers the new 
weapons we have, and those which the enemy is likely to have. 
Now what to use as a basis for these new concepts? The 
Principles of War. They are based on all of military history and 
have stood the test of some revolutonary weapon developments 
and radical concepts of how to employ weapons. 
Before presenting them, a few words of .caution concerning 
their application are in order. They should not be considered as if 
they were religious tenets, but rather as guides in planning and ex­
ecuting military operations. The correct application of any one, or 
several of them, will not assure success, particularly when, at the 
same time, another of the principles is violated. In fact, the correct 
application of all of the principles may not assure success providing 
the morale forces are lacking. The human elements-morale, dis­
cipline, leadership-are so vital to success that they deserve our 
first and uninterrupted attention. You will recall that according to 
Napoleon "Moral force is to the physical as three to one." There 
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is always present the danger of becoming so engros&ed in the theory, 
art, or science of war (whatever you choose to call it) that the 
human factors are lost sight of, the initiative restricted, or the 
imagination dam�ened. There is also the danger of making the as­
sumption that these principles are all inclusive and offer a magic 
formula to resolve any military problem. A military commander 
must resolve for himself what the principles of war imply, and how 
they should be applied. 
']Clausewitz, a century ago, included the "gaining of public 
opinion", as one of the three fundamental objectives in war. It is 
probably just as important today-if not more so-than it was 100 
years ago, but to my knowledge it is not included in any present 
day listings of the principles of war. Nevertheless, one should exer­
cise in the application of the fundamentals of war in studying mili­
tary history and in the solution of military problems, until their 
use becomes second nature. In the heat of battle, application of 
these principles should be subsconscfous, not self-conscious. 
Currently the Army Command and Staff School lists nine 







7. Economy of Forces;
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Although you will not find the principles of war listed in 
any of the USF publications, as such, you will find the funda­
mental truths embodied in these principles in the doctrine and 
instructions contained in the Fleet Publications. 
The War Manual of the Royal Navy lists a total of ten prin­
ciples of war, which are, for the most part; identical to those taught 
in the U. S. Army. They do not, however, include Simplicity; 
instead they list Maintenance of Morale and Administration. 
Using the Command and Staff School list I shall make a few 
comments on each of the principles, with particular emphasis on 
their application to naval strategy and tactics. 
OBJECTIVE 
If any of the principles may be said to be more important 
than the others, that one is the principle of the objective. It is 
certainly fundamental, for it defines . the. mission or the aim. 
From the national strategic level it defines our national ob­
jective or aim. In war it implies the imposition of our nation's 
will upon that of the enemy. From the level of high military 
strategy it implies the imposition of our will by destruction of his 
will to resist, and normally, but not necessarily, entails the des­
truction of a large portion of his armed forces. 
At every level of command the proper selection of the ob­
jective is of the greatest importance. Properly, it should be one 
which supports the objective or mission of the next higher level. 
An excellent example of maintenance of the objective, (and 
I might say here that the British call this principle "Selection and 
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Maintenance of the Aim" rather than simply the Objective) is 
Admiral Spruance's action in defending the landing operations in 
the Marianas against naval air and naval surface attack instead of 
rushing out to meet the oncoming Japanese Fleet. The primary 
mission was an offensive one-the seizure of the Marianas. That 
mission could be best accomplished by isolating the objective area 
and defending against any incursion by the enemy. Admir.al 
Spruance, keeping in mind the primary mission, took a course of 
actio1½ which. would most nearly assure that mission being ac­
complished. 
Generally, in a naval engagement the tactical objective may 
be con�idered to be that part of the enemy's sea-air forces which 
has been selected for destruction or neutralization. By. tactical 
maneuvers one's major forces should be brought to bear on that 
part of the enemy's which it is important to overwhelm, the Bat­
tle of Midway is a · splendid example of a proper selection of the 
physical objective. Although the Japanese troop ships were 
tempting targets, the carriers were the main threat and were 
therefore chosen as the primary objective. 
OFFENSIVE 
This principle stems from an aggressive state of mind or a 
will to destroy the enemy. It is characterized by a desire on the 
part of the Commander and his subordinates to get at the enemy 
and to destroy him. Nelson embodied that spirit in his tactics of 
closing the enemy and annihilating him. It entails an assumption 
of the initiative and of denying the initiative to the enemy. 
The principle of the offensive does not imply that the de­
fensive should be ignored. Clausewit� contends that the defense 
is · "the stronger form of warfare" and that therefore a weaker foe 
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has a fair chance of assisting a more powerful one. Passive de­
fense measures, such as assuming tactical dispositions best suited 
to defend against threatening att�ck, are essential to avoid des­
truction. But the defensive measures should be employed so as to 
permit the seizing of any opportunity to take the initiative and 
to counter-attack with all the violence at one's command. The de­
fensive must always be assumed in the spirit of the offensive. It 
inay, for example, be assumed merely as a time device to gain time 
to mass the necessary forces at the proper place and at the prop­
er moment to commence the attack. 
The offensive does not imply headlong attack. It seeks to 
bring a vigorous and timely concentration of forces against a weak­
er concentration. A splendid example of the application of the 
principle of the offensive was had in the action of the Allies in 
landing in North Africa in 1942, on which occasion the initiative 
passed to us and our allies and remained with us for the remainder 
of the war. 
If the assumption of the offensive is going to comprise the 
chances of carrying out a mission, it may be necessary to assume 
the tactical defensive. For example,. the mission of an Escort Com­
mander of getting a convoy through might well require him to 
maintain a strong defensive formation and position and thus 
restrict his initiative in closing and attacking a threatening :force. 
Care must be exercised in assuming the offensive that one's 
own force is not over-extended or dissipated to the point that an 
enemy counter-attack will be successful. The principle of the of­
fensive implies a well-timed, well-coordinated attack at a decisive 
point. But it implies more than that. It implies an attack within 
the capabilities of the forces making the attack, in order that 
it may be sustained and followed up. Sustaining the offensive 
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is of such importance that some military students include in the 
principles of war the principle of pursuit. The success with which 
the German air force pursued the break-through in the low 
countries and in France in the last war and with which Montgom­
ery's "Desert Rats" pursued Rommel· certainly indicate that pur­
suit is a vitally important aspect of the Offensive if not deserving 
of a classification as a separate Principle of War. 
MASS 
This principle goes by many names-superiority, concen­
tration, force, and power. It does not necessarily imply an over-all 
superiority in numbers. It does imply a superiority of fighting 
power at a decisive point. 
To enumerate all the factors of fighting power would be an 
insurmountable task, but some of the main factors, as far as naval 
power is concerned, are fire power and fire concentration includ­
ing air power, ability to withstand punishment, maneuverability, 
and, of course, the human factors, such as morale and leadership. 
And, although a superiority may be enjoyed in several of the fac­
tors, it may not be enough if one or more of the others is lacking. 
For example, in spite of the enormous material superiority which 
the Japanese enjoyed at the Battle off Samar, the poor leadership 
of the Japanese Forces deprived them of an impressive tactical vic-: 
tory, if not a strategic one. 
MANEUVER 
Movement is the means by which plans are placed into effect. 
Maneuver, then, may be said to be the catalytic agent which fuses 
together the other principles. By mobility, forces may accomplish 
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mass or surprise. It gives to the Commander flexibility and free­
dom of action which he might not otherwise enjoy. 
Movement does not necessarily imply rapidity, although 
speed is frequently a vital factor in war. Movement is a relative 
matter, particularly in a tactical sense .. Certainly, the imp<>rtance 
of thinking of movement in terms of relative movement or relative 
motion need not be emphasized to officers of your experience. And, 
the importance of rapid, secure, and reliable communications in 
taking full advantage of the principle of movement is obvious. 
Three of Jomini's four fundamental principles of strategy 
are just as fundamental to naval tactics, and emphasize the enor­
mous part that movement plays in the art of war: 
"1. Maneuvering in such a manner as to engage one's major 
forces against parts only of those of the enemy. 
"2. In battle, by tactical maneuvers, bringing one's major 
forces to bear on the decisive area of the battlefield or on 
that part of the enemy's lines which it is important to 
overwhelm. 
"3. Arranging matters in such fashion that these masses of 
men be not only brought to bear at the decisive place but 
that they be put into action speedily and together, so that· 
they may make a simultaneous effort." 
In each of . these principles, maneuver and mobility is · the 
key to their successful application. 
And it is this principle of movement or mobility which gives 
such strength to carrier air power, The ability to move carriers 
quickly from the South Pacific to meet the Japanese threat at Mid­
way permitted our,Navyto strike a blow at the Japanese Forces of 
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such consequences as to change the balance of nav1;1.l power in the 
Pacific and to change the complexion of the war from the strategic. 
defensive to the strategic offensive. And while air power is in a 
tactical sense highly mobile, it is not so in ·a strategic sense, unless ·· 
the enormous air base installations and logistic requirements are 
available where required, or unless it is carrier borne. It is then, 
from this principle of movement or mobility that naval air power 
draws its great strength. 
SURPRISE 
Surprise may be · said to be a two-bladed weapon. On the 
one edge it is capable of inflicting great initial damage on the enetny; 
on the other of affecting adversely enemy morale, sometimes to the 
point of throwing· him .into complete confusion and thus making 
possible his destruction before he is able to regain his balance. 
Many_ things are conducive to effecting surprise--secrecy, 
deception, careful planning, faultless and rapid execution. Most 
important and often the most difficult to attain is secrecy, particu­
larly today with the great emphasis which is being placed on In­
telligence and with the many means available to collect in­
telligence. And yet, it appears that it is still possible to effect 
surprise---at least initially on a grand scale, for there is little evi­
dence available to refute that the invasion of south Korea came as a 
complete tactical surprise, if not as a strategic one. 
This principle ma,y be applied in the nature of surprise as to
time, place, force, technique, direction, and weapons employed. 
An excellent example of naval tactical surprise as to time is 
in the Battle of Savo Island, where the Japanese cruiser force 
arrived on the scene much ahead of the time that it was expected 
they might, if indeed they were expected at all, with the result 
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that four Allied cruisers were destroyed in almost as many minutes, 
before any effective fire could be returned on the Japanese 
attack­ing force. 
There are many examples where new weapons have come 
as complete tactical surprise-tanks, gas, magnetic mines, 
influence fuses, atomic bombs. Seldom, if ever, have they been 
decisive in determining the outcome of the war, ev�m though it 
appears that the new weapons, in some instances, might have been 
capable of so doing had they been fully exploited by the power 
which first had those weapons. The difficulty arises from the 
failure to employ them in mass, and from the failure to withhold 
them until such time as they can be so employed on a continuing 
basis. If surprise is to be most effective, it must be employed in 
conjunction with the other principles of war, particularly mass. 
New weapons often present contradictions which affect materially 
how and when they should be employed. The longer they are 
withheld, the greater the chance that the enemy will learn of 
them, especially when they are placed in mass production and 
when large numbers of personnel are en­gaged in training in their 
employment. Furthermore, it is a gamble to divert a large portion 
of one's war potential to the production and to training in the 
employment of a new weapon not battle­tested. It would 
appear that in World War I, the British might have been able 
to change the whole course of the war had they withheld the 
tank until it was available to the Allies for use in large 
numbers; or, in World War II, that the Germans might have been 
able to bring England to terms had they not employed the 
magnetic mine until they were able to do so in such mass as to 
tie up all shipping seeking ingress or egress to the British Isles. 
Instead, both of these new and revolutionary developments in 
war­fare were employed initially on a small scale and Before they 
could be used in mass. Thus, the opponents succeeded in developing a
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countermeasure or a defense against them, as has always been true 
when a new weapon is employed. 
As for the atomic bomb or the H-bomb, weapons of mass 
destruction, they can hardly be classed now as weapons of strategic 
surprise by virtue of being new weapons. However, they may be 
used as weapons of tactical surprise, both by us and the enemy, as 
to time, place, and technique of their employment. It, therefore, 
behooves us to give serious study to the offensive and defensive 
tactical implications of this new weapon. Having lost its effect­
iveness as a new weapon of strategic surprise, might it not be em­
ployed to advantage tactically as well as strategically? 
Before leaving this principle, I should like to point out that 
one of the inherent strengths of sea-air power is its ability to 
achieve surprise, both strategically and tactically. Mobility and 
weather are two factors which greatly contribute to this ability. 
Some may contend that as a result of new developments 
such as long range all-weather search planes, equipped with 
A. E.W., it is no longer possible.for Carrier Task Forces to.achieve 
surprise. On that I should like to make these observations. The 
achieving of tactical surprises will be more difficult. However, if 
developments in carriers and ·carrier-based all-weather long range 
attack planes and A. E. W. planes are permitted to go ahead, the 
achieving of tactical surprise should stiU be possible. As for 
strategic surprise, the comparative strategic mobility of carrier­
based air forces, as opposed to that of great land-based air forces, 
will still make it possible for carrier air power to achieve strategic 
surprise. It is significant that Germany was not able to move any 
appreciable amount of air power to resist the movement of the 
Allies onto the beaches of Normandy. 
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SECURITY 
Security includes all measures to deny to the enemy the 
means of gaining intelligence or of inflicting damage on own forces. 
It also embraces means to obtain information about the enemy in 
order to institute better security measures, such as protecting own 
lines of communications. 
It implies a defensive attitude, but there are occasions when 
the offensive must be assumed to gain the necessary security for 
own forces. For example, the offensive was assumed in our land­
ings at Guadalcanal in order to obtain security for our lines of com­
munication to Australia while we were still on the strategic de­
fensive. 
Among the passive measures which may be essential to se­
curity from a naval viewpoint are: radio silence, combat air 
patrols, electronic countermeasures, air searches, ASW patrols, 
radar pickets, zigzags, radio and radar intercept watches. These 
and many others may be employed to avoid the enemy's taking one's 
forces by surprise and to better enable one's own forces to be pre­
pared to resist attack and to counterattack effectively. 
Before leaving. this principle of security, there is another 
aspect thereof which is today more significant than at any time in 
history since the Trojan horse; that is, security on the home front, 
security against the fifth column, and security against subversion 
and sabotage. These may be the most powerful weapons in the 
enemy's arsenal, unless we are forever on guard and take the of­
fensive against them whenever and wherever the occasion demands. 
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ECONOMY OF FORCE 
Economy of Force implies a proper proportionment of avail­
able forces both in regard to space and time. It aims at effecting 
mass at the decisive place at the proper time. To do so may 
necessitate a reduction of forces at other points to those required 
to maintain the bare minimum of security. It, thus, entails a com­
promise between concentration and dispersion. It should aim to ef­
fect the desired concentration of own forces while, at the same time, 
causing the enemy to disperse his forces. 
Although economy of force does not imply, in a tactical 
sense, cutting down all along the line to bare essentials, it does im­
ply that in the strategic sense. For, as the scope of wars seems ever 
to increase and the limit of the nation's natural resources to de­
crease, it becomes more and more urgent that we weigh contin­
ually· the gain against the cost and strive to proportion properly 
our sources of national strength, such as manpower, critical ma­
terials and industrial capacity. Both, strategically and tactically, 
the selection of proper weapons to be employed is of vital importance 
in application of the principle. 
Economy of force, like that of surprise, again brings out in­
herent strength in sea-air power. The strength is derived, in the ap­
plication of this principle, from the ability of sea-air forces to con­
centrate great striking power at any one of many points about an 
enemy's defensive perimeter, thus making him disperse to meet this 
ever present threat. During the past war in the Pacific, the Fast 
Carrier Task FoI'ces were employed on the strategic offensive (and it 
should be noted that Admiral Nimitz and the Joint Chiefs opposed 
any operations ':'7hich would; for an extended period, tie these forces 
down to a defensive role) fThus employed, they were able not only to 
inflict great material dama�e on the Japanese forces;, but, probably· 
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more important, they were able �o require a wide dispersion of 
enemy forces, especially air forces, and to make possible the isola­
tion of any objective. 
And, in spite of some contentions to the contrary that never 
again will major amphibious forces be employed, circumstances and 
economy of force may dictate that such a course of action is best. 
In the last war with Allied troops concentrated in the Brit­
ish Isles and the necessary air and naval forces available to project 
them against the continent of Europe, Germany was forced to 
disperse her defenses from Norway -to the southern coast of 
France. Thus, both sea-air and amphibious forces permit own forces 
to be concentrated, while, at the same time, requiring the en'emy 
to disperse his forces. 
UNITY OF COMMAND 
Unity of Command implies cooperation. In fact, until recent­
ly, the Army Command and Staff School called this principle the 
Principle of Cooperation. The British still do. 
With the · advent of the Western Union and the Atlantic 
Pact, this principle takes on a significance far greater than ever 
before, for it aims at unified action, not only among armed forces 
of our nation, but among all the nations with a common aim., It has, 
as its root, a spirit of unselfishness, a feeling of confidence in leader­
ship, and a desire to do, .within the limits of capabilities, what is 
necessary to accomplish the objecUve without seeking for one's self, 
one's ship, one's service, one's nation, any glory except that which 
may accrue, in the course of eve,nts, from doing that which needs 
to be done for a common cause. 
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It is a principle to which we must constantly direct our at­
tention. The cooperation which characterized the relations between 
the United States, Britain, and the British Commonwealth Nations 
during the past war was excellent. The problem of attaining a 
similar degree of cooperation and unity of command among the 
twelve (12) North Atlantic Pact Nations is one of the greatest 
magnitude. 
1-'here is an ever growing feeling among the Atlantic Pact 
Nations that Unity of Command must be effected if that Pact is 
going to succeed in accomplishing its objective. That feeling has 
been expressed in recent speeches of such leaders as Mr. Churchill 
and Mr. Spaak. 
Cooperation, fortunately, is something which can be learned 
and nurtured in our daily contacts. It is a spirit which must be de­
veloped before the heat of action. And it must be developed to 
such a degree among our Allies that Unity of Command will be at­
tained. 
SIMPLICITY 
Simplicity is a principle which may be applied to many factors 
in war-among others, organization, planning, order writing, man­
euver, weapon and equipment design. It makes for order and 
tends to eliminate the well known process of order-eounter­
order-disorder. 
Many of you will recall how our fleet maneuvers, during a 
period between the two world wars, became more and more com­
plicated, year by year, until we got to the point that the captain of 
a capital ship needed one of two signal officers, a tactical officer and 
a couple of plotters to assist and advise him in formation maneuvers, 
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. and how the three or. four signal halyards were �ept, almost_ con­
stantly chock-a-block with bunting. I recall how one of our Ad­
mirals used to deplore, with great rage, that tendency, and point 
out that, during his tour of duty as a destroyer skipper in the 
Irish Sea during World War I, the only special flags or pennants 
that he ever saw were Corpen, Turn and Speed. , He said that we 
must simplify our maneuvers if we ever got into action. Our Fleet 
did not appreciate that fact until we did get into a shooting war, 
when it became necessary that we revise our tactical concepts; or at 
least our techniques of maneuvering. However, in the field of 'am­
phibious warfare, there still remains much to be done to simplify 
those inherently complicated operations. 
Simplicity in order writing has many virtues. It reduces·. 
the verbiage, it reduces the load of communications, it adds to se­
curity, and probably most important of all, it may give the sub­
ordinate some freedom of action and permit him to use his in­
itiative. One of the keys to this is to tell WHAT is to be done and 
avoid telling the subordinate HOW it is to be done. 
In conclusion, strategy and tactics, like war itself, are ever 
changing and depend on weapons. As new weapons become avail­
able,. new strategic and tactical concepts for their emplQyment 
must be evolved, and evolved quickly. The best guides we have 
available in developing these new co)?.cepts, in the absence of a 
shooting war, during which they should and can be evolved and 
tested, are the Principles of War-objective, offensive, mass, man, 
euver, surprise, security, economy of force, unity of command, an_d 
simplicity. While it may seem at times that these principles are 
contradictory they are in fact complementary, the application of any 
one or several of them may not assure success. The necessary 
blending of them all is essential. But even more essential are the 
human factors of morale, discipline, and leadership. 
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This section lists material published in current periodicals 
which will be of interest and value to officers of the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Co�st Guard. 
"Korean Attack Opens New Chapter in History." 
By John Foster Dulles. Department of State Bulletin. 
August 7. 
"How Strong Is the Red Air Force?" 
By Albert Douglas. The Reporter. August 29. 
"The Communists in America." 
By Robert H. Jackson. Harper's. September. 
"Get Guerrilla,.Wise/' 
By Major Robert B. Rigg. United States Army Combat 
- Forces Journal. September.
"Do We Have Enough Strategic Materials for War?" 
By John Connor. Collier's. September 9. 
''The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with 
the Western System." 
By Dr. W.W. Kulski. The American Journal of Inter­
national Law. July. 
"Our Last, Best Hope for Peace." 
By Bernard M. Baruch. Look. September 26. 
"The Riddle of the Russian Sea." 
By James P. O'Donnell. The Saturday Evening Post. 
�eptember 9. 
"Stalin Takes a Breather." 
By David J. Dallin. The New Leader. September 9. 
"Korea--Tougher to Crack Than Okinawa." 
By Captain Walter Karig, USNR. Collier's. September 23. · 
"The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia." 
By Milton Sacks. Pacific Affairs. September. 
"How Russia Built the North Korean Army." 
By Kyril Kalinov. The Reporter. September 26. 
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